We've curated a range of papers on pensions governance across the world. Here is a flavour of some of the best papers:
This 44 page document is aimed particularly at Investment Committee members in the US; whether experienced or not, with responsibility for any fund type, including DB or DC pensions, endowments, foundations and healthcare plans. Different sections include fiduciaries' roles and responsibilities, ethics, conflicts of interest, investment governance, investment objectives and process, fund manager selection and fees, and outsourced CIO arrangements.
This 2014 document reveals the results of the 8th annual UK survey of pension scheme governance for the UK Pensions Regulator (TPR). The survey was carried out amongst trust-based DC, DB and hybrid pension schemes.
This 12 page paper from Karen Volpato at AIST examines the Australian landscape for superannuation governance, hiw it is changing and how it compares with global pensions funds. It examines questions of Trust Law, describes how the "Equal Representation" model in Australia operates and asks whether the requirement for independent directors is beneficial.
In this 18 page discussion of US Pensions Governance, the authors analyzed the various governance structures employed by state retirement systems. The paper covers topics such as reporting and authority structures, monitoring and expertise, investment structures and the flexibility of pensions systems to respond to a changed environment (e.g. level of funding). The authors examine the changes that could be made to generate improved outcomes.
This 15 page report, issued by KPA Advisory Services, indicates that, although progress is being made towards better pensions governance, there is a long way still to go. The study examines the link between governance and genuinely long-term investing, and suggests that better governance leads to a longer-term approach.
This is a 10 point "call-to-action" from Aon Hewitt to DC Plan Sponsors in 2013. It argues that most US DC plans rely to heavily on passive automation, having sub-optimal DC pension designs and inadequate investment choices.